Formal Modelling of Emotions in BDI Agents

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Abstract. Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behaviour is guided not only by beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of emotions in reasoning and decision-making. The $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic is a formal system for expressing the concepts of the Emotional-BDI model of agency. In this paper we present an improved version of the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic and show how it can be used to model the role of three emotions in Emotional-BDI agents: *fear*, *anxiety* and *self-confidence*. We also focus in the computational properties of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ which can lead to its use in automated proof systems.

1 Introduction

Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behaviour is guided not only by beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of emotions in reasoning and decision-making. This conceptual model was developed by Pereira *et al.* [1] and a first version of the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic was presented in [2], where a first formalisation of *fear* was given. In this paper we present an improved version of the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic in order to model the role of three emotions in Emotional-BDI agents: *fear*, *anxiety* and *self-confidence*. The aim of this paper is to show how $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic has enough expressivity to model some of the properties of these emotions, following Oliveira & Sarmento's model of emotional agent [3,4,5].

The main motivation for the current work was to provide a formal system in which the concepts of the Emotional-BDI model of agency could be logically expressed. Using these concepts we can specify distinct behaviours which are expected from agents under the influence of emotions. The existing formal systems for rational agency such as Rao & Georgeff's BDI logics [6,7] and Meyer's *et al.* **KARO** framework [8,9,10,11] do not allow a straightforward representation of emotions. However, both have properties which we can combine in order to properly model Emotional-BDI agents.

The $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic is an extension of the $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ logic, equipped with explicit reference to actions, capabilities and resources. The choice of $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$, and not the more

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powerful $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}^*}$, was motivated by our interest in automated proof methods that will allow the development of executable specification languages of rational agency or of formal verification systems for the Emotional-BDI model of agency.

This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we define the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic. This logic is based in $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ logic and we begin by presenting the new operators that were added. Besides the syntax and semantics of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$, we present the axiom systems for the new modal operators. We also establish the decidability of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae, by transforming $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae into equivalent $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ ones. In Section 3 we use the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-logic to define a set of conditions which are pre-requisites for defining how emotions are activated in Emotional-BDI agents and also special purpose actions which are executed by the agent when it "feels" these emotions. In Section 4 we model the activation and effects of each of the emotions in Emotional-BDI agents using the previous conditions. In Section 5 we give some information about the ongoing implementation work on the decision procedures of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$. In Section 6 some related work is considered. Finally, in Section 7 we present some conclusions about this work and point some topics for ongoing and future research in the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic.

2 The $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ Logic

The $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ is an extension of Rao & Georgeff's $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$. This extension adds new modal operators for representing the concepts of fundamental desires, capabilities, action execution and resources. The semantics of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ is therefore given by the satisfiability of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae on extended $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$-models, considering accessibility-relations and functions for modelling the new operators.

2.1 Informal Description

The $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ logic is a multi-modal logic which combines Emerson's *et al.* branching-time logic CTL [12] and modal operators for representing the mental states of belief (Bel), desire (Des) and intention (Int) as defined by Bratman *et al.* in [13]. The underlying model of $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ has a two dimensional structure. One dimension is a set of possible worlds that correspond to the different perspectives of the agent representing his mental states. The other is a set of temporal states which describe the temporal evolution of the agent. A pair $\langle world, temporal\_state \rangle$ is called a *situation*. In the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic we added the following modal operators:

Fundamental desire: a fundamental desire is a desire which represents vital conditions to the agent, like its life or alike propositions. We model this concept using the modal operator Fund.

Actions: in $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ we consider regular actions as defined in Propositional Dynamic Logic PDL [14]. In this way we can refer to the actions that the agent performs, in particular when he is under the influence of emotions. Given a finite set of atomic actions, regular actions are derived through the usual test operator ? and regular action operations (sequence, disjunction and Kleene closure).

Capabilities: a capability represents the operational structure of the execution of an action. This concept is similar to **KARO**'s *ability*. This is represented by the modal operator Cap.

Resources: resources are the means (physical or virtual) for engaging the execution of actions. For the modelling of resources we consider the operators:

- $\mathsf{Needs}(a, r)$: the atomic action a needs a unit of the resource r to be executed.
- $\mathsf{Available}^q(r)$: the agent has q units of the resource r, with $0 \leq q \leq MAX$, $MAX > 0$.
- $\mathsf{Saved}^q(r)$: the agent has q units of resource r saved for future usage.

We also consider the operator Res for representing the availability or not of all the resources needed to execute a regular action. We consider both $\mathsf{Available}$ and Saved operators for the following reasons: the $\mathsf{Available}$ operator provides only information about the available resources at the agent's current state of execution. No extra-information is given about the amount of resources available in the future. However, this last information is important for agent decision-making. If an agent considers that it would be inevitable to execute some action in the future, it may also consider necessary to protect the needed resources from being badly used and therefore not available when really needed. This "protection" of resources is given by the Saved operator. If a unit of a resource r is saved it cannot be used in other actions. It must first be freed and made available by the agent.

In terms of actions we consider three families of special purpose atomic actions, for the management of resource availability:

- $\mathtt{get}(r)$: the agent gets one more unit of the resource r and this unit becomes available for being used.
- $\mathtt{save}(r)$: the agent saves one unit of the resource r which was previously made available to the agent.
- $\mathtt{free}(r)$: the agent frees one unit of the resource r which has been previously saved by the agent and makes it available to be used.

2.2 Syntax

As in $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ we distinguish between *state formulae*, which are evaluated in a single situation, and *path formulae* which are evaluated along a path.

Definition 1. *Considering a non-empty set of propositional variables P, a finite set of atomic actions A_{At} that include the set of resource availability management actions, a finite set of resource symbols R and a set of resource quantities $\{0, \ldots, MAX\}$, with $MAX > 0$, the language of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae is given by the following BNF-grammar:*

- *state-formulae:*
  $\varphi ::= p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \langle\alpha\rangle\varphi \mid \mathsf{E}\psi \mid \mathsf{A}\psi \mid \mathsf{Bel}(\varphi) \mid \mathsf{Des}(\varphi) \mid \mathsf{Int}(\varphi) \mid$
  $\mathsf{Fund}(\varphi) \mid \mathsf{Needs}(a, r) \mid \mathsf{Available}^q(r) \mid \mathsf{Saved}^q(r) \mid \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \mid \mathsf{Res}(\alpha)$
  where $p \in P$, $a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}$, $r \in R$ and $0 \leq q \leq MAX$.

– *path-formulae:*
  $\psi ::= \mathsf{X}\varphi \mid (\varphi \mathsf{U} \varphi)$
– *regular actions (A_{Ra}):*
  $\alpha ::= id \mid a \in A_{\mathsf{At}} \mid \varphi? \mid \alpha; \alpha \mid \alpha + \alpha \mid \alpha^*$

In addition, we introduce the following abbreviations: $\top$, $\bot$, $\varphi \vee \psi$ and $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ are abbreviations of $\neg(p \wedge \neg p)$ (with p being a fixed element of P), $\neg\top$, $\neg(\neg\varphi \wedge \neg\psi)$ and $\neg(\varphi \wedge \neg\psi)$, respectively; $\mathsf{AF}\varphi$, $\mathsf{EF}\varphi$, $\mathsf{AG}\varphi$ and $\mathsf{EG}\varphi$ are abbreviations of $\mathsf{A}(\top \mathsf{U} \varphi)$, $\mathsf{E}(\top \mathsf{U} \varphi)$, $\neg\mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi$ and $\neg\mathsf{AF}\neg\varphi$, respectively. The formula $[\alpha]\varphi$ stands for $\neg\langle\alpha\rangle\neg\varphi$. Iterated action α^n, with $n \geq 0$, are inductively defined by $\alpha^0 = id$ and $\alpha^{(n+1)} = \alpha; \alpha^n$. Informally, X means *next temporal state*, U *true until*, F *in a future temporal state*, G *globally true*. The path quantification modal operators E and A mean, respectively, *in one path* and *in all paths*. The regular action modal operator $\langle\alpha\rangle$ means *possibly true after a execution of* α.

2.3 Semantics

$\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae are interpreted in extended $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ models, called $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-models. We follow Schild's approach to $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ [15], by considering a *situation* as a pair $\delta = \langle w, s\rangle$, where s is a temporal state of the non-empty set T and w refers to a world (mental state perspective) from the non-empty set W.

Definition 2. *Given a non-empty set of situations Δ, a non-empty set of propositional variables P, a finite set of atomic actions A_{At}, a set of resource symbols R and a positive constant MAX, we define an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-model as a tuple:*

$$M = \langle \Delta, \mathcal{R}_T, \{\mathcal{R}_a : a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}, V, C, avl, svd, needs\rangle$$

such that:

– $\mathcal{R}_T \subseteq \Delta \times \Delta$ *is a temporal accessibility-relation, such that:*
  • *it is serial,* i.e., $\forall\delta \in \Delta$, $\exists\delta' \in \Delta$ *such that* $(\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{R}_T$*;*
  • *if* $(\langle w_i, s_j\rangle, \langle w_k, s_l\rangle) \in \mathcal{R}_T$*, then* $w_i = w_k$*.*
– $\mathcal{R}_a \subseteq \mathcal{R}_T$ *is an atomic action accessibility-relation, with* $a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}$*;*
– $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F} \subseteq \Delta \times \Delta$ *are accessibility-relations for the mental state operators. These relations have the following property (considering* $\mathcal{O} \in \{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$*):*

$$\textit{if } (\langle w_i, s_j\rangle, \langle w_k, s_l\rangle) \in \mathcal{O} \textit{ then } s_j = s_l;$$

– $V : P \rightarrow \wp(\Delta)$ *is a propositional variable labelling function;*
– $C : A_{\mathsf{At}} \rightarrow \wp(\Delta)$ *is a capability labelling function;*
– $needs : A_{\mathsf{At}} \rightarrow \wp(R)$ *is a function that defines which resource symbols in R are needed to execute each action of A_{At};*
– $avl : \Delta \times R \rightarrow \{0, \ldots, MAX\}$ *is a function that for each situation defines which quantity of each resource is available;*
– $svd : \Delta \times R \rightarrow \{0, \ldots, MAX\}$ *is a function that for each situation defines which quantity of each resource is saved.*

As in $\mathsf{BDI_{CTL}}$ path-formulae are evaluated along a path $\pi_\delta = (\delta_0, \delta_1, \delta_2, \ldots)$, such that $\delta = \delta_0$ and $\forall i \geq 0$, $(\delta_i, \delta_{i+1}) \in \mathcal{R}_T$. The k^{th} element of a path π_δ is denoted by $\pi_\delta[k]$.

The accessibility-relation and the capability labelling function for atomic actions are extended to regular actions α, as usual in PDL and **KARO**. We denote them, respectively, by R_α^A and c_α^A.

For the modelling of resources the functions *avl* and *svd* verify the following properties:

- the total amount of resources which the agent can deal with cannot be greater than MAX:
  $\forall \delta \in \Delta, \forall r \in R,\ 0 \leq avl(\delta, r) + svd(\delta, r) \leq MAX$.
- the execution of an atomic action consumes one unit of each resource needed for the execution of that action:
  $\forall r \in needs(a), \forall (\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{R}_a,\ avl(\delta', r) = avl(\delta, r) - 1$.

Also, we assume that for the resource management atomic actions we have:

$$needs(\mathtt{get}(r)) = needs(\mathtt{save}(r)) = needs(\mathtt{free}(r)) = \emptyset,\ \forall r \in R$$

The availability of resources for executing regular actions is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
res :\ & A_{\mathsf{Ra}} \rightarrow \wp(\Delta) \\
res_a\ &= \begin{cases} \{\delta \mid \text{if } r \in needs(a) \text{ then } avl(r, \delta) \geq 1\}, & \text{if } needs(a) \neq \emptyset \\ \Delta, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \\
res_{\varphi?}\ &= \Delta \\
res_{\alpha;\beta}\ &= \{\delta \mid \delta \in res_\alpha \wedge \exists (\delta, \delta') \in R_\alpha^A,\ \delta' \in res_\beta\} \\
res_{\alpha+\beta} &= res_\alpha \cup res_\beta \\
res_{\alpha^*}\ &= \cup_{n \geq 0}(res_{\alpha^n})
\end{aligned}$$

The intuition behind the value of the resource availability function res for α^* is that the iterated execution of α is bounded to the existence of a finite amount of resources. We are now in conditions to define the satisfiability for an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula.

Definition 3. *Let M be an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-model and δ a situation. The* satisfiability *of an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula is defined inductively as follows:*

- *state formulae satisfaction rules:*
  - $M, \delta \models p$ *iff* $\delta \in V(p)$
  - $M, \delta \models \neg\varphi$ *iff* $M, \delta \not\models \varphi$
  - $M, \delta \models \varphi \wedge \psi$ *iff* $M, \delta \models \varphi$ *e* $M, \delta \models \psi$
  - $M, \delta \models \mathsf{E}\psi$ *iff exists a path* π_δ *such that* $M, \pi_\delta \models \psi$
  - $M, \delta \models \mathsf{A}\psi$ *iff for all paths* π_δ, $M, \pi_\delta \models \psi$
  - $M, \delta \models \langle\alpha\rangle\varphi$ *iff exists* $(\delta, \delta') \in R_\alpha^A$ *such that* $M, \delta' \models \varphi$
  - $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Bel}(\varphi)$ *iff for all* $(\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{B}$, $M, \delta' \models \varphi$
  - $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$ *iff for all* $(\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{D}$, $M, \delta' \models \varphi$

- $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Int}(\varphi)$ *iff for all* $(\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{I}$, $M, \delta' \models \varphi$
- $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)$ *iff for all* $(\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{F}$, $M, \delta' \models \varphi$
- $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha)$ *iff* $\delta \in c^A_\alpha$
- $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Needs}(a, r)$ *iff* $r \in needs(a)$
- $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Available}^q(r)$ *iff* $avl(\delta, r) = q$
- $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Saved}^q(r)$ *iff* $svd(\delta, r) = q$
- $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Res}(\alpha)$ *iff* $\delta \in res_\alpha$

– *path formulae satisfaction rules:*

- $M, \pi_\delta \models \mathsf{X}\varphi$ *iff* $M, \pi_\delta[1] \models \varphi$
- $M, \pi_\delta \models \varphi_1 \mathsf{U} \varphi_2$ *iff* $\exists\, k \geq 0$ *such that* $M, \pi_\delta[k] \models \varphi_2$ *and* $\forall j,\ 0 \leq j < k \left(M, \pi_\delta[j] \models \varphi_1\right)$

2.4 Properties of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$

The axiomatic characterisation of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$'s modal operators of time and BDI mental states are the same as in $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$-logic. The modal operator Fund, for fundamental desires, follows the axiom set of Des and Int operators, which is the KD system [16], *i.e.*, $\mathcal{F}$ is a serial accessibility-relation. The Bel operator verifies the $KD45$ axioms, *i.e.*, $\mathcal{B}$ is an equivalence relation. The temporal operators follow the axioms of CTL and the action execution operators verify the axioms of PDL. Since both branching-time and regular action execution structures coexist, we have the following properties:

Theorem 1. *Let M be an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-model, a an atomic action and α a regular action. We have:*

1. *if* $M, \delta \models \langle a \rangle \varphi$ *then* $M, \delta \models \mathsf{EX}\varphi$, $a \neq id$.
2. *if* $M, \delta \models \langle \alpha \rangle \varphi$ *then* $M, \delta \models \mathsf{EF}\varphi$.
3. *if* $M, \delta \models \langle \alpha^* \rangle \varphi$ *then* $M, \delta \models \mathsf{E}(\langle \alpha \rangle \top \mathsf{U} \varphi)$.

Proof (sketch). In the first case, let $M, \delta \models \langle a \rangle \varphi$. Then it exists $(\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{R}_a$ such that $M, \delta' \models \varphi$. By definition, $(\delta, \delta') \in \mathcal{R}_T$ and it exists $\pi_\delta = (\delta, \delta', \ldots)$ such that $M, \pi_\delta[1] \models \varphi$. Again, by definition, we have $M, \delta \models \mathsf{EX}\varphi$.

In the second case, we proceed by induction in the structure of α. The base case proves along the lines of the previous proof. For the induction step, we present here only the case of $\alpha = \beta + \gamma$ we have $M, \delta \models \langle \beta \rangle \varphi$ or $M, \delta \models \langle \gamma \rangle \varphi$. By the induction hypothesis we $M, \delta \models \mathsf{EF}\varphi$ or $M, \delta \models \mathsf{EF}\varphi$, which is equivalent $M, \delta \models \mathsf{EF}\varphi$. The other cases are proved analogously.

For the last case proceed again by induction on α. We only present the base case. Let $\alpha = a$. By definition it exists $n \geq 0$ such that $M, \delta \models \langle a^n \rangle \varphi$. Therefore it exists δ' such that $(\delta, \delta') \in R^A_{a^n}$ and $M, \delta' \models \varphi$. Considering now the path $\pi_\delta = (\pi_\delta[0], \pi_\delta[1], \ldots, \pi_\delta[n-1]).\pi'$ such that $\pi_\delta[n] = \pi'[0] = \delta'$. Since $\forall(\pi_\delta[i], \pi_\delta[i+1]) \in R^A_a$, for $0 \leq i \leq n-1$ by definition we have $M, \pi_\delta[i] \models \langle a \rangle \top$ for the same i and $M, \pi_\delta[n] \models \varphi$. By definition and considering the path π_δ we have $M, \delta \models \mathsf{E}(\langle a \rangle \top \mathsf{U} \varphi)$.

Capabilities are characterised similarly to *abilities* in the **KARO** framework. The axioms for the Cap modal operator are:

- $\mathsf{Cap}(\varphi?) \leftrightarrow \top$
- $\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha;\beta) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \wedge \langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{Cap}(\beta)$
- $\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha+\beta) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \vee \mathsf{Cap}(\beta)$
- $\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha^*) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \wedge \langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha^*)$
- $\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \wedge \langle\alpha^*\rangle(\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \rightarrow \langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha)) \rightarrow \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha^*)$

Resource availability for regular actions follows almost the same axioms that characterise the Cap operator. However, the unbounded composition operator * behaves differently, bounding the execution of an action α^* to a finite number of compositions of α. This composition stops when there are no resources to execute α once more. The Res operator verifies the following axioms:

- $\mathsf{Res}(\mathtt{get}(r)) \leftrightarrow \top$
- $\mathsf{Res}(\mathtt{save}(r)) \leftrightarrow \top$
- $\mathsf{Res}(\mathtt{free}(r)) \leftrightarrow \top$
- $\mathsf{Res}(\varphi?) \leftrightarrow \top$
- $\mathsf{Res}(a) \leftrightarrow \bigwedge_{r\in R}\left(\mathsf{Needs}(a,r) \rightarrow \bigvee_{n=1}^{MAX} \mathsf{Available}^n(r)\right)$
- $\mathsf{Res}(\alpha;\beta) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Res}(\alpha) \wedge \langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{Res}(\beta)$
- $\mathsf{Res}(\alpha+\beta) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Res}(\alpha) \vee \mathsf{Res}(\beta)$
- $\mathsf{Res}(\alpha^*) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Res}(\alpha) \wedge \langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{Res}(\alpha^*)$
- $\mathsf{Res}(\alpha^*) \wedge \langle\alpha^*\rangle(\mathsf{Res}(\alpha) \rightarrow \langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{Res}(\alpha)) \rightarrow \mathsf{Res}(\alpha^*)$

Resources are also characterised by axioms which deal with the modal operators Available, Needs and Saved. First we define some abbreviations that represent, respectively, the maximum quantity of available and saved resources, in a situation:

- $\mathsf{MaxAvl}^q(r) =_{def} \mathsf{Available}^q(r) \wedge \neg\mathsf{Available}^{(q+1)}(r)$
- $\mathsf{MaxSvd}^q(r) =_{def} \mathsf{Saved}^q(r) \wedge \neg\mathsf{Saved}^{(q+1)}(r)$

The following axioms characterise the interaction between action execution and resource availability, considering $a \notin \{\mathtt{get}(r), \mathtt{save}(r), \mathtt{free}(r) \mid r \in R\}$:

- $\mathsf{MaxAvl}^q(r) \wedge \mathsf{Needs}(a,r) \rightarrow [a]\mathsf{MaxAvl}^{(q-1)}(r),\ 0 < q \leq MAX$
- $\mathsf{MaxAvl}^q(r) \wedge \neg\mathsf{Needs}(a,r) \rightarrow [a]\mathsf{MaxAvl}^{q}(r),\ 0 \leq q \leq MAX$

The following axioms characterise the dynamics of the availability of resources, considering both resource availability limits and the execution of the special actions to manage them. We have:

- resource availability limits:
  - $\mathsf{Available}^0(r),\ \forall r \in R$
  - $\mathsf{Saved}^0(r),\ \forall r \in R$
  - $\mathsf{Available}^q(r) \rightarrow \mathsf{Available}^{(q-1)}(r),\ 1 < q \leq MAX$
  - $\mathsf{Saved}^q(r) \rightarrow \mathsf{Saved}^{(q-1)}(r),\ 1 < q \leq MAX$

– resource availability and resource management actions:
  - $\mathsf{Needs}(\mathtt{get}(r), r') \rightarrow \bot$, $\forall r, r' \in R$
  - $\mathsf{Needs}(\mathtt{save}(r), r') \rightarrow \bot$, $\forall r, r' \in R$
  - $\mathsf{Needs}(\mathtt{free}(r), r') \rightarrow \bot$, $\forall r, r' \in R$
  - $\mathsf{MaxAvl}^q(r) \rightarrow [\mathtt{get}(r)]\mathsf{MaxAvl}^{(q+1)}(r)$, for $0 \leq q < MAX$
  - $\mathsf{MaxAvl}^q(r) \wedge \mathsf{MaxSvd}^{q'}(r) \rightarrow [\mathtt{save}(r)](\mathsf{MaxAvl}^{(q-1)}(r) \wedge \mathsf{MaxSvd}^{(q'+1)}(r))$, with $0 \leq q + q' \leq MAX$
  - $\mathsf{MaxAvl}^q(r) \wedge \mathsf{MaxSvd}^{q'}(r) \rightarrow [\mathtt{free}(r)](\mathsf{MaxAvl}^{(q+1)}(r) \wedge \mathsf{MaxSvd}^{(q'-1)}(r))$, with $0 \leq q + q' \leq MAX$

2.5 Decidability

The decidability of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ is obtained by transforming an original $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula φ into a new formula φ' which is evaluated in a modified $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-model. This modified model is a $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$-model which considers the accessibility relation $\mathcal{F}$ and special propositional variables which represent the execution of atomic actions, capabilities and resource availability. Let $\mathcal{L}$ be an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ language and P the set of propositional variables. We define a new language $\mathcal{L}'$ equal to $\mathcal{L}$ except that it has a new set of propositions P' that is the union of the following disjunct sets:

– the set of propositional variables P,
– the set of propositional variables which represent the atomic actions: $\{done\_a \mid a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}\}$,
– the set of propositional variables which represent the capabilities for atomic actions: $\{cap\_a \mid a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}\}$,
– the set of propositional variables which represent the resources for atomic actions: $\{res\_a \mid a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}\}$,
– a set of propositional variables for representing the various quantities of resources available: $\{avl\_q\_r, svd\_q\_r \mid q \in \{0, \ldots, MAX\}, r \in R\}$,
– a set of propositional variables for representing the resources needed for the execution of each atomic action: $\{needs\_a\_r \mid a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}, r \in R\}$.

Considering an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-model M, the modified model M' is defined as follows, extending the propositional labelling function of M.

Definition 4. *Let M be an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-model such that:*

$$M = \langle \Delta, \mathcal{R}_T, \{\mathcal{R}_a : a \in A_{\mathsf{At}}\}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}, V, C, avl, svd, needs \rangle,$$

a model M' is a tuple:

$$M' = \langle \Delta, \mathcal{R}_T, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}, V' \rangle,$$

such that $V' : P' \to \wp(\Delta)$ *is defined as follows, where* $a \in A_{\mathsf{at}}$, $p \in P$ *and* $r \in R$*:*

- $V'(p) = V(p)$,
- $V'(done\_a) = \{\delta' \mid (\delta, \delta') \in R_a^A\}$,
- $V'(cap\_a) = C(a)$,
- $V'(res\_a) = res_a$,
- $V'(avl\_q\_r) = \{\delta \mid M, \delta \models \mathsf{Available}^q(r)\}$,
- $V'(svd\_q\_r) = \{\delta \mid M, \delta \models \mathsf{Saved}^q(r)\}$,
- $V'(needs\_a\_r) = \{\delta \mid M, \delta \models \mathsf{Needs}(a, r)\}$.

Note that in V' only atomic actions are considered. Therefore, any $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula must be normalised into an equivalent one where only atomic actions can occur.

Definition 5. *For all* $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$*-formula* φ *there exists a normalised formula* $\varphi' \equiv \xi(\varphi)$*, such that the normalisation* ξ *is inductively defined as follows:*

- *normalisation of regular action formulas:*
  $\xi(\langle a \rangle \varphi) = \langle a \rangle \xi(\varphi)$,
  $\xi(\langle \psi? \rangle \varphi) = \xi(\psi \wedge \varphi)$,
  $\xi(\langle \alpha \rangle (\varphi \vee \psi)) = \xi(\langle \alpha \rangle \varphi) \vee \xi(\langle \alpha \rangle \psi)$,
  $\xi(\langle \alpha; \beta \rangle \varphi) = \xi(\langle \alpha \rangle \langle \beta \rangle \varphi)$,
  $\xi(\langle \alpha + \beta \rangle \varphi) = \xi(\langle \alpha \rangle \varphi) \vee \xi(\langle \beta \rangle \varphi)$,
  $\xi(\langle id \rangle \varphi) = \xi(\varphi)$,
  $\xi(\langle \alpha^{(n+1)} \rangle \varphi) = \xi(\langle \alpha \rangle \langle \alpha^n \rangle \varphi)$,
  $\xi(\langle \alpha^* \rangle \varphi) = \xi(\mathsf{E}(\langle \alpha \rangle \top \mathsf{U} \varphi))$.
- *normalisation of capability formulas:*
  $\xi(\mathsf{Cap}(a)) = \mathsf{Cap}(a)$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Cap}(\varphi?)) = \top$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha; \beta)) = \xi(\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \wedge \langle \alpha \rangle \mathsf{Cap}(\beta))$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha + \beta)) = \xi(\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha)) \vee \xi(\mathsf{Cap}(\beta))$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha^*)) = \xi(\mathsf{E}(\mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \wedge \langle \alpha \rangle \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha)) \mathsf{U} \top))$.
- *normalisation of resource formulas:*
  $\xi(\mathsf{Needs}(a, r)) = \mathsf{Needs}(a, r)$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Available}^q(r)) = \mathsf{Available}^q(r)$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Saved}^q(r)) = \mathsf{Saved}^q(r)$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Res}(a)) = \mathsf{Res}(a)$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Res}(\varphi?)) = \top$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Res}(\alpha; \beta)) = \xi(\mathsf{Res}(\alpha) \wedge \langle \alpha \rangle \mathsf{Res}(\beta))$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Res}(\alpha + \beta)) = \xi(\mathsf{Res}(\alpha)) \vee \xi(\mathsf{Res}(\beta))$,
  $\xi(\mathsf{Res}(\alpha^*)) = \xi(\mathsf{E}(\mathsf{Res}(\alpha) \wedge \langle \alpha \rangle \top)) \mathsf{U} \neg \mathsf{Res}(\alpha)))$.

– *normalisation of other formulas:*
$\xi(\top) = \top$,
$\xi(p) = p$,
$\xi(\neg\varphi) = \neg(\xi(\varphi))$,
$\xi(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \xi(\varphi) \wedge \xi(\psi)$,
$\xi(\mathsf{A}\psi) = \mathsf{A}(\xi(\psi))$,
$\xi(\mathsf{E}\psi) = \mathsf{E}(\xi(\psi))$,
$\xi(\mathsf{X}\varphi) = \mathsf{X}(\xi(\varphi))$,
$\xi(\varphi_1 \mathsf{U} \varphi_2) = (\xi(\varphi_1)\mathsf{U}\xi(\varphi_2))$,
$\xi(\mathsf{Bel}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Bel}(\xi(\varphi))$,
$\xi(\mathsf{Des}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Des}(\xi(\varphi))$,
$\xi(\mathsf{Int}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Int}(\xi(\varphi))$,
$\xi(\mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Fund}(\xi(\varphi))$,

After normalisation, we apply the transformation defined below, so that the resulting formula can be evaluated in a model M'.

Definition 6. *Let φ be an normalised $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula. The transformation of φ to φ' is given by τ, inductively defined as follows:*

– *propositional-formulae:*
$\tau(\top) = \top$,
$\tau(p) = p$,
$\tau(\neg\varphi) = \neg(\tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \tau(\varphi) \wedge \tau(\psi)$.
– *temporal-formulae:*
$\tau(\mathsf{A}\psi) = \mathsf{A}(\tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau(\mathsf{E}\psi) = \mathsf{E}(\tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau(\mathsf{X}\varphi) = \mathsf{X}(\tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau(\varphi_1 \mathsf{U} \varphi_2) = (\tau(\varphi_1)\mathsf{U}\tau(\varphi_2))$.
– *action execution formulae:*
$\tau(\langle a \rangle \varphi) = \mathsf{EX}(done\_a \wedge \tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau([a]\varphi) = \mathsf{AX}(done\_a \rightarrow \tau(\varphi))$.
– *mental-state formulae:*
$\tau(\mathsf{Bel}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Bel}(\tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau(\mathsf{Des}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Des}(\tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau(\mathsf{Int}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Int}(\tau(\varphi))$,
$\tau(\mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)) = \mathsf{Fund}(\tau(\varphi))$,
– *capabilities and resources formulae:*
$\tau(\mathsf{Cap}(a)) = cap\_a$,
$\tau(\mathsf{Res}(a)) = res\_a$,
$\tau(\mathsf{Needs}(a, r)) = needs\_a\_r$,
$\tau(\mathsf{Available}^q(r)) = \bigwedge_{0 \leq s \leq q}(avl\_s\_r)$,
$\tau(\mathsf{Saved}^q(r)) = \bigwedge_{0 \leq s \leq q}(svd\_s\_r)$.

Now we can present the following theorem.

Theorem 2. *Let M be an $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-model, δ a situation and φ a normalised $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula. If $M, \delta \models \varphi$ then $M', \delta \models \tau(\varphi)$.*

Proof. (Sketch). Proof is done by induction of the structure of φ. We present here only the case $\varphi = \mathsf{Cap}(a)$. Assume that $M, \delta \models \mathsf{Cap}(a)$. By definition, $\delta \in C(a)$. By definition of M' we get $\delta \in V'(cap\_a)$ which is equivalent to $M', \delta \models cap\_a$. Since $\tau(\mathsf{Cap}(a)) = cap\_a$ we get $M', \delta \models \tau(\mathsf{Cap}(a))$.

Using this theorem, we obtain the decidability of a $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula φ by transforming it into $\tau(\xi(\varphi))$ and applying to the latter the tableau construction for $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$, with a rule for expanding formulas containing the Fund modal operator. The algorithm for building such tableau is based on the decision procedures for $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$, developed by Rao & Georgeff in [6]. In particular we use the notions of *fully extended propositional tableau* and of a *fragment* $DAG[w, \varphi]$ as defined in the cited work of Rao & Georgeff.

Definition 7. *Let ψ be a $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formula and $\tau(\xi(\psi)) = \varphi$. The tableau construction for $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ is defined as follows:*

1. *build a tree with just one node w_0, called root, such that $L(w_0) = \{\varphi\}$.*
2. *repeat $(a) - (d)$ until none apply:*
   - *(a)* build a propositional tableau: *if w is a leaf, $L(w)$ is not inconsistent, $L(w)$ is not a propositional tableau and ψ is the smaller witness of this fact, then:*
     - *i. if ψ is $\neg\neg\gamma$, create a node w', son of w, such that $L(w') = L(w) \cup \{\gamma\}$,*
     - *ii. if ψ is $\gamma \wedge \theta$, create a node w', son of w, such that $L(w') = L(w) \cup \{\gamma, \theta\}$,*
     - *iii. if ψ is $\neg(\gamma \wedge \theta)$, create two nodes w' and w'', sons of w, such that $L(w') = L(w) \cup \{\neg\gamma\}$ e $L(w'') = L(w) \cup \{\neg\theta\}$.*
   - *(b)* build a fully extended propositional tableau: *if w is a leaf, $L(w)$ is not inconsistent, $L(w)$ is not a fully extended propositional tableau and ψ is a witness of this fact, then create two nodes w' e w'', sons of w, such that $L(w') = L(w) \cup \{\psi\}$ e $L(w'') = L(w) \cup \{\neg\psi\}$,*
   - *(c)* extend CTL-formulas: *if w is a leaf, $L(w)$ is not inconsistent, $L(w)$ is a fully extended propositional tableau and contains the formulas $\mathsf{AX}\varphi_1$, $\ldots, \mathsf{AX}\varphi_n$,$\mathsf{EX}\psi_1, \ldots, \mathsf{EX}\psi_m$, then create m successors i, each containing the set $\{\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n, \psi_i\}$,*
   - *(d)* create mental states operator successors: *if w is a leaf, $L(w)$ is not inconsistent and $L(w)$ is a fully extended propositional tableau, then:*
     - *i. if $L(w)$ contains $\neg\mathsf{Bel}(\varphi_1), \ldots, \neg\mathsf{Bel}(\varphi_n), \mathsf{Bel}(\psi_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Bel}(\psi_m)$, then create n $\mathcal{B}$-successors w_i, each containing $\{\neg\varphi_i, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m\}$;*
     - *ii. if $L(w)$ contains $\neg\mathsf{Des}(\varphi_1), \ldots, \neg\mathsf{Des}(\varphi_n), \mathsf{Des}(\psi_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Des}(\psi_m)$, then create n $\mathcal{D}$-successors w_i, each containing $\{\neg\varphi_i, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m\}$;*
     - *iii. if $L(w)$ contains $\neg\mathsf{Int}(\varphi_1), \ldots, \neg\mathsf{Int}(\varphi_n), \mathsf{Int}(\psi_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Int}(\psi_m)$, then create n $\mathcal{I}$-successors w_i, each containing $\{\neg\varphi_i, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m\}$;*
     - *iv. if $L(w)$ contains $\neg\mathsf{Fund}(\varphi_1), \ldots, \neg\mathsf{Fund}(\varphi_n), \mathsf{Fund}(\psi_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Fund}(\psi_m)$, then create n $\mathcal{F}$-successors w_i, each containing $\{\neg\varphi_i, \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_m\}$;*

(e) mark nodes as "satisfiable": *if w is not marked as "satisfiable", then mark it as so if:*
   i. $L(w)$ is not a fully extended CTL *tableau and exists a successor w' of w which is marked as "satisfiable";*
   ii. $L(w)$ is a fully extended CTL *tableau and all formulas* $\mathsf{AX}\varphi$ *and* $\mathsf{EX}\varphi$ *are satisfied (through the existence of a fragment $DAG[w, \varphi]$) and all the $\mathcal{B}$,$\mathcal{D}$,$\mathcal{I}$,$\mathcal{F}$-successors are marked as "satisfiable",*
   iii. $L(w)$ is a fully extended CTL *tableau and don't exist formulas of the type* $\mathsf{AX}\varphi$*, nor the type* $\mathsf{EX}\varphi$*, nor the type* $\neg\mathsf{Bel}(\varphi)$*, nor the type* $\neg\mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$*, nor the type* $\neg\mathsf{Int}(\varphi)$ *nor the type* $\neg\mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)$*, and $L(W)$ is not inconsistent.*

3. *if the root of the tableau is marked as "satisfiable" then return "φ is satisfiable". Otherwise return "φ is not satisfiable".*

Extending the work of Rao & Georgeff [6], we have the decidability of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$:

Theorem 3. *The $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic is decidable.*

Proof. The extension of the syntax and semantics of $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ to support the Fund operator is similar to the proof of the decidability of the modal operators of Des and Int in [6].

3 Preliminaries for Modelling Emotions in $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$

In this section we present a series of concepts which will be useful for modelling emotions in $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$. These concepts refer to conditions that are the basis for modelling the activation of emotions and the consequences that these emotions have in the behaviour of the agent.

3.1 Resource Management Actions

We begin by defining special regular actions for dealing with resource management. For that we consider the following abbreviations for regular actions:

- $\mathtt{If}(\varphi, \alpha) =_{def} (\varphi?; \alpha)$
- $\mathtt{IfE}(\varphi, \alpha, \beta) =_{def} \mathtt{If}(\varphi, \alpha) + \mathtt{If}(\neg\varphi, \beta)$
- $\mathtt{WhileDo}(\varphi, \alpha) =_{def} ((\varphi?; \alpha)^*); \neg\varphi?$

We also consider a special function which, given a finite set of regular actions S, returns the composition of all the actions in S, in some order (in this function we consider that regular actions commute). This function, which we denominate by *eval_set*, is inductively defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathit{eval\_set} && : \wp(A_{\mathsf{Ra}}) \rightarrow A_{\mathsf{Ra}} \\ &\mathit{eval\_set}(\emptyset) && = id \\ &\mathit{eval\_set}(\{\alpha\} \cup S) && = \alpha; \mathit{eval\_set}(S),\ \alpha \notin S \end{aligned}$$

Based on the atomic actions for the of resource management, we define the following set of resource management regular actions:

GET: the agent gets all the resources needed to execute some atomic action. Considering:
$Cond_1(a, r) = \mathsf{Needs}(a, r) \wedge \mathsf{MaxAvl}^0(r)$
we have:
$\mathtt{GET}(a) = eval\_set(\{\mathtt{If}(Cond_1(a, r), \mathtt{get}(r)) \mid r \in R\})$

SAVE: the agent saves a unit of each resource needed to execute an atomic action. Considering:
$Cond_2(a, r) = \mathsf{Needs}(a, r) \wedge \mathsf{MaxSvd}^0(r)$
we have:
$\mathtt{SAVE}(a) = eval\_set(\{\mathtt{If}(Cond_2(a, r), \mathtt{IfE}(\mathsf{Avl}(r), \mathtt{save}(r), \mathtt{get}(r); \mathtt{save}(r))) \mid r \in R\})$

FREE: the agent frees the resources previously saved for executing an atomic action. Considering:
$Cond_3(a, r) =_{def} \mathsf{Needs}(a, r) \wedge \mathsf{Saved}^1(r)$
we have:
$\mathtt{FREE}(a) = eval\_set(\{\mathtt{If}(Cond_3(a, r), \mathtt{free}(r)) \mid r \in R\})$

All these definition scale for regular actions $\alpha \in A_{\mathsf{Ra}}$ and we can work with for instance $\mathtt{FREE}(\alpha)$ instead of $\mathtt{FREE}(a)$.

3.2 Proposition Achievement

For the agent to succeed in the execution of an action it must have both the capability and resources for that action. We denote the existence of both of them as *effective capability*. Formally we have:

- $\mathsf{EffCap}(\alpha) =_{def} \mathsf{Cap}(\alpha) \wedge \mathsf{Res}(\alpha)$

The agent also considers if it *can* or *cannot* execute some action to achieve the truth of some proposition. Formally we have:

- $\mathsf{Can}(\alpha, \varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi \wedge \mathsf{EffCap}(\alpha))$
- $\mathsf{Cannot}(\alpha, \varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\neg\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi \vee \neg\mathsf{EffCap}(\alpha))$

3.3 Risk and Favourable Conditions

The activation of emotions is based on conditions of the environment that show to be positive or negative to the desires and fundamental desires of the agent. First we define the following conditions:

Risk condition: a proposition φ is said to be *at risk* if there is a next situation in which $\neg\varphi$ is true:
$\mathsf{AtRisk}(\varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{EX}(\neg\varphi)$

Possibly at risk: a proposition φ is said to be *possibly at risk* if there exists a future situation where $\neg\varphi$ is true. Formally this is defined as:
$\mathsf{PossAtRisk}(\varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{EF}(\neg\varphi)$

Safe: a proposition φ is said to be *safe* if it will always be true in the future. Formally we have:
$\mathsf{Safe}(\varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{AF}(\varphi)$

On believing on the above, and the propositions being either fundamental desires or only desires, the agent distinguishes between three types of conditions for activating emotions:

1. *Threats:* a *threat* is a condition of the environment in which a fundamental desire is in imminent risk of failure. We consider the following kinds of threats:
   - a fundamental desire φ is said to be *threatened* if the agent believes that φ is at risk:
     $\mathsf{Threatened}(\varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\mathsf{AtRisk}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)$
   - a fundamental desire φ is said to be *threatened by a proposition* ψ if the agent believes that the truth of ψ implies φ being at risk:
     $\mathsf{ThreatProp}(\psi, \varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\psi \rightarrow \mathsf{AtRisk}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)$
   - a fundamental desire φ is said to be *threatened by the execution of an action* a if the agent believes that the successful execution of a will put φ at risk:
     $\mathsf{ThreatAct}(a, \varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\langle a \rangle \mathsf{AtRisk}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)$ $\mathsf{ThreatsEffC}(a, \varphi) =_{def}$ $\mathsf{Bel}(\neg \mathsf{EffCap}(a) \rightarrow \mathsf{AtRisk}(\langle a \rangle \varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)$

2. *Not favourable:* a condition is *not favourable* if it reveals a possible failure of one of the agent's desires, in the future. As in the case of the threats, we consider the following kinds of not favourable conditions:
   - $\mathsf{NotFavourable}(\varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\mathsf{PossAtRisk}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$
   - $\mathsf{NotFavourableProp}(\psi, \varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\psi \rightarrow \mathsf{PossAtRisk}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$
   - $\mathsf{NotFavourableAct}(\alpha, \varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\langle \alpha \rangle \mathsf{PossAtRisk}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$

   Note that here we consider regular actions instead of atomic ones since the risk condition is not bounded to verify in a next situation.

3. *Favourable:* a condition is said to be *favourable* if it refers to a current situation of the environment in which a desire of the agent has the possibility to be achieved. We define the following kinds of favourable conditions:
   - $\mathsf{Favourable}(\varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\mathsf{Safe}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$
   - $\mathsf{FavourableProp}(\varphi, \psi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\psi \rightarrow \mathsf{Safe}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$
   - $\mathsf{FavorableAct}(\alpha, \varphi) =_{def} \mathsf{Bel}(\langle \alpha \rangle \mathsf{Safe}(\varphi)) \wedge \mathsf{Des}(\varphi)$

4 Modelling Emotions in $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$

In this section we present the modelling of three emotions within $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic: *Fear*, *Anxiety* and *Self-Confidence*. For each of these emotions we model both its activation conditions and the effects that their presence have in the future

behaviour of an Emotional-BDI agent. This modelling is based in the work of Oliveira & Sarmento in [4].

The activation condition of each of the emotions corresponds precisely to a condition defined in the previous section. We opted by this approach to avoid the logical omniscience problem [17]. The use of a notation $Emotion(F(\varphi))$ allows a more intuitive meaning and can help in the future development of a formal calculus for (emotional) $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae.

4.1 Fear

The activation of fear occurs when a fundamental desire of the agent is put at risk of failure. Using other words, fear is activated when the agent detects a threat. Therefore we have the following kinds of fear:

- $\mathsf{Fear}(\neg\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{Threatened}(\varphi)$
- $\mathsf{Fear}(\psi \rightarrow \neg\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{ThreatsProp}(\psi, \varphi)$
- $\mathsf{Fear}(\langle a\rangle\neg\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{ThreatsAct}(a, \varphi)$

The main effect of fear is bringing the agent into a cautious perspective towards the environment and, in particular, to the threat he detected. Depending on the kind of threat, the agent will aim at avoiding that threat. We consider the following behaviours under the effect of fear:

- if the agent can avoid a threat through the execution of an action a the he intends to execute it:
  $\mathsf{Fear}(\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(a, \varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle a\rangle\varphi)$
- if the agent cannot avoid the threat through an action a then he does not intend to execute it:
  $\mathsf{Fear}(\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Cannot}(a, \varphi) \rightarrow \neg\mathsf{Int}(\langle a\rangle\varphi)$
- if the agent can avoid a proposition which is a threat, or can make the proposition and the fundamental desire coexist – both through the execution of an action – then the agent intends to execute that action:
  $\mathsf{Fear}(\psi \rightarrow \neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(a, \neg\psi) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle a\rangle\neg\psi)$
  $\mathsf{Fear}(\psi \rightarrow \neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(a, \psi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle a\rangle(\psi \wedge \varphi))$
- if the execution of an action is a threat to the agent then the agent will not intend to execute it (possibly for achieving some proposition ψ) until it causes no fear:
  $\mathsf{Fear}(\langle a\rangle\neg\varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{A}(\neg\mathsf{Int}(\langle a\rangle\top)\mathsf{U}\neg\mathsf{Fear}(\langle a\rangle\varphi))$
- if the agent believes that an action a for which it does not have resources can eliminate the threat, then one of the following conditions apply:
  1. the agent can eliminate the fear by freeing previously saved resources to execute other action:
     $\mathsf{Fear}(\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Cannot}(a, \varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Bel}([\mathtt{FREE}(\alpha)]\mathsf{Can}(a, \varphi)) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle \mathtt{FREE}(\alpha); a\rangle\varphi)$
  2. the agent believes it can get the resources for a before compromising its fundamental desire:
     $\mathsf{Fear}(\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Cannot}(a, \varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Bel}([\mathtt{GET}(\alpha)]\mathsf{Can}(a, \varphi)) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle \mathtt{GET}(\alpha); a\rangle\varphi)$

4.2 Anxiety

The activation of anxiety occurs when the desires of the agent can be at risk in the future. Therefore, anxiety works as preventive alert system towards future situations which may compromise the overall performance of the agent. We consider the following kinds of anxiety activation:

- $\mathsf{Anx}(\mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{NotFavourable}(\varphi)$
- $\mathsf{Anx}(\psi \rightarrow \mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{NotFavourableProp}(\psi, \varphi)$
- $\mathsf{Anx}(\langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{NotFavourableAct}(\alpha, \varphi)$

The effects of anxiety are mainly preparing the agent to face future risk conditions, or to avoid them before they occur. We consider the following cases:

- if an action α guarantees that the desire will not be at risk, the agent intends to execute α. If he does not have enough resources, he will save them:
  $\mathsf{Anx}(\mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(\alpha, \mathsf{AF}\varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{AF}\varphi)$
  $\mathsf{Anx}(\mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{AF}\varphi) \wedge \neg\mathsf{Res}(\alpha) \rightarrow \langle\mathtt{SAVE}(\alpha)\rangle\mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{AF}\varphi)$
- if a proposition causes anxiety and the agent has a way to either negate that proposition or make that proposition coexist with the desire possibly at risk, then the agent will execute that action:
  $\mathsf{Anx}(\psi \rightarrow \mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(\alpha, \mathsf{AF}(\neg\psi \vee (\psi \wedge \varphi)) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{AF}(\neg\psi \vee (\psi \wedge \varphi)))$
- if the execution of an action is causing anxiety and the execution of that action is an intention of the agent, the agent will not intend it until it becomes harmful:
  $\mathsf{Anx}(\langle\alpha\rangle\mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{AX}(\mathsf{A}(\neg\mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi)\mathsf{UBel}(\mathsf{AF}\varphi)))$

4.3 Self-confidence

Self-confidence represents the well-being of the agent relatively to the future achievement of one of its desires. Using other words, if a desire is in a favourable condition to be achieved, the agent feels self-confidence about its achievement. We consider the following kinds of self-confidence:

- $\mathsf{SConf}(\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{Favourable}(\varphi)$
- $\mathsf{Sconf}(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \equiv \mathsf{FavourableProp}(\psi, \varphi)$
- $\mathsf{SConf}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi) \equiv \mathsf{FavourableAct}(\alpha, \varphi)$

Self-confidence deals mostly with the maintainance of intentions. Since the desires are considered to be achievable, the agent only cares about maintaining them in the set of intentions until he believes he achieved them. We consider the following kinds of behaviour:

- if the agent already intends a desire to which he is self-confident about, the agent will continue to intend it until he believes it is achieved:
  $\mathsf{SConf}(\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{A}(\mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi)\mathsf{UBel}(\varphi))$
- if the agent still does not intend the desire, he will begin to intend it from the next situation on:
  $\mathsf{SConf}(\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(\alpha, \varphi) \wedge \neg\mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{AXInt}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi)$

- if a proposition causes self-confidence about a desire, then the agent will start intending that proposition and also intend both the proposition and the desire itself:
  $\mathsf{SConf}(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(\alpha, \psi) \wedge \neg\mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\psi) \rightarrow \mathsf{AXInt}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi)$
  $\mathsf{SConf}(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\psi \wedge \varphi)$
- if the agent has the resources needed to execute an action which will guarantee the achievement of a desire to which it is self-confident about, then the agent will free those resources and intend to get them right before executing the action:
  $\mathsf{SConf}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Int}(\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi) \wedge \mathsf{Saved}(\alpha) \rightarrow \langle\mathtt{FREE}(\alpha)\rangle\mathsf{Int}(\langle\mathtt{GET}(\alpha); \alpha\rangle\varphi)$

4.4 Usability of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$

The main goal behind the development of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ was to provide a language expressive enough to specify conditions where emotions are triggered and the effect that the presence of such emotions have in the behaviour of the agent. The formulas we presented in the Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are not supposed to be all present but rather combined to fit the special needs of the environment and role of the agent. This combination should define the *emotional state* of the agent. This mental state works on top of the properties already present in the BDI logic.

Lets consider a scenario where a fire-fighter agent is fighting a nearby fire. It is acceptable that the agent may fear of being burned, although believing that he can extinguish the fire. The emotional state would contain:

1. $\mathsf{Fear}(\neg\mathtt{healthy})$
2. $\mathsf{SConf}(\mathtt{extinguished\_fire})$

The result of this emotional state could be getting back to protect from very close fire but still continuing to throw it water, which is formalised as:

1. $\mathsf{Fear}(\neg\mathtt{healthy}) \wedge \mathsf{Can}(\mathit{get\_back}, \mathtt{healthy}) \rightarrow \mathsf{Int}(\langle\mathit{get\_back}\rangle)\mathtt{healthy}$
2. $\mathsf{A}(\mathsf{Int}(\langle\mathit{through\_water}\rangle\mathtt{extinguished})\mathsf{UBel}(\mathtt{extinguished}))$

We could select different conditions to model for instance another fire-fighter agent fighting the fire, a police agent, etc.

5 Implementation

We have implemented the tableau algorithm presented in Section 2.5 for determining the satisfiability of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulas. Our implementation was done in the Prolog language. Currently we are implementing $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ syntax and semantics as a module of the Coq interactive theorem prover system [18]. Our aim is to provide a computational mean of doing model-checking for $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae. We base our approach in the work of de Wind [19] in implementing normal modal logic in Coq plus some implementations of formal concepts present in the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic and already implemented in Coq, as CTL logic.

6 Related Work

The work which more relates to the one we present in this paper is the one of Meyer in [20], where he proposes the formal modelling of *happiness*, *sadness*, *anger* and *fear* in the **KARO** logical framework.

Meyer suggests the introduction of a modal operator $Goal_m(\varphi)$ which represents a so called *maintainance goal*. This modal operator is used to model fear with a similar intuition as the one behind our $\mathsf{Fund}(\varphi)$ modal operator, *i.e.*, to define a more important kind of desire. In terms of modelling the evolution of the agent, Meyer uses computational sequences of atomic actions to refer to future states of an agent, while we use the standard CTL's temporal operators.

In a more recent work, Meyer and Dastani introduce the modelling of emotions previously done in an agent oriented programming language [21]. In this work the authors present transition rules for the generation of each of the emotions modelled in [20]. This generated emotions are then feed into the programming language's deliberation process which determine the effects that these emotions have in the mental states of an agent.

Comparing both approaches we conclude that:

1. Our approach provides a more expressive language to model emotions in BDI agents. The combination of time and action execution and the detailed definition of resources and resource-management notions fits in the needs of emotional agent architecture [3,1,2].
2. The new operators which we introduced were conveniently defined syntactically and semantically. The work of Meyer introduces similar concepts but just in the language of its logic. Our work also has a strong focus on the logical foundations of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ whereas Meyer's work focus only in expressing emotional states of rational agents.

Despite the differences, both logical frameworks try to model rational agents with emotions in the same context: they are not interested about the internal structure of the emotions, but only in specifying at which conditions they are activated and how their presence influence the behaviour of the agent.

7 Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper we have presented an improved version of the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ logic to model the activation and effects of emotions in the behaviour exhibited by a Emotional-BDI agent. The emotions analysed were fear, anxiety and self-confidence. This formalisation was based in the $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$ logic, which was extended with the notions of fundamental desire, explicit reference to actions, capabilities and resources.

We have shown that the satisfiability of $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae can be reduced to the satisfiability of $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$-formulae. We have implemented an extended version of the $\mathsf{BDI}_{\mathsf{CTL}}$'s tableau decision procedure for $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$-formulae.

Currently we are developing a library for the Coq interactive theorem prover system [18] with the purposes of reasoning and model-checking specifications of Emotional-BDI agents within the $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{BDI}}$ framework.

As a future work, it would be interesting to add a notion of graded importance to the Fund modal operator in order to provide a more accurate notion of the importance of a desire to the decision-making process of an agent, in the line of the work done by Godo *et al.* in [22].

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